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BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
to a distribution of the estate's assets. The resulting standard does
not permit a valuation above the amount of cash the executor can
realize upon a sale of the mutual fund shares. If this standard is fol-
lowed in other courts, it seems clear that the application of the
retail market test as a whole, and not merely in the area of mutual
fund shares, will be found unreasonable, although the retail mar-
ket test is a fair application of intent of the estate tax.
JAMES E. BROWN
TORTS-LIABILITY OF VEHICLE OWNER TO THIRD PARTIES
INJURED BY THIEF'S NEGLIGENT OPERATION OF VEHICLE, WHERE
KEYS LEFT IN IGNITION LED TO THEFT
On June 28, 1969 between 10:00 and 10:30 p.m. defendant,
Gorsky, attended a V.F.W. field day event with a close friend. The
defendant parked his car in the vicinity of the event. At approx-
imately 11:30 p.m. that evening the car was stolen by two youths
aged 16 and 17. The elder thief drove and, as a result of his
negligence, the Gorsky vehicle collided with a car driven by the
plaintiff, Guaspari, and occupied by his wife and daughter. The
plaintiff brought actions against the defendant for personal
injuries, medical expenses, property damages and wrongful death.
The actions were based on the defendant's alleged violation of
New York's Vehicle and Traffic Law, section 1210 (a),' the plain-
tiff claiming that the defendant left the keys in the ignition.
Both Gorsky and his friend testified that the keys were removed
from the ignition, but that a spare set was left in the glove
compartment of the car. However, the thief testified that the keys
were in the ignition when he entered the vehicle, though his
testimony was attenuated by the discovery that the other thief
had entered the automobile first and searched the glove com-
partment. Jury verdicts were rendered for the plaintiff and the
defendant appealed on the law and facts. The Appellate Divi-
sion for the Fourth Department affirmed. Held, defendant's
1. N.Y. VEHICLE AND TRAFFIC LAW § 1210 (a) (McKinney 1970) provides:
"No person driving or in charge of a motor vehicle shall permit it to stand
unattended without first stopping the engine, locking the ignition, removing the key from
the vehicle ......
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violation of the statute created jury questions as to defendant's
negligence and the proximate cause of the injury. Guaspari v.
Gorsky, 36 App. Div. 2d 225, 319 N.Y.S.2d 708 (4th Dep't 1971).2
Liability for negligence generally depends on the establish-
ment of four factors: (1) the finding of a duty owed by one party
to another; (2) breach of that duty; (3) damages; and (4) a
finding that the proximate cause of those damages was the breach
of the duty.3 Negligence itself is often considered to encompass
only the first two factors; that is, a duty and its breach.4 Liability,
however, depends on all four elements. Absent a statutory pro-
vision such as section 1210 (a), courts have generally been un-
willing to impose liability on a party under facts similar to
those described above.5 These decisions have been based on
either or both of two grounds: (1) that the owner6 owed no
duty to a third party injured by a thief's negligent driving of a
stolen vehicle and (2) that the proximate cause of the injury
was not the failure to remove the keys from the ignition. In ex-
amining the question of the duty owed by an owner in this situa-
tion the courts have often held, as a matter of law, that the
foreseeability of these occurrences was such that no duty could
be imposed on the defendant.7 "The risk reasonably to be per-
ceived defines the duty . ... ,8 Those courts which apply
this reasoning have concluded that an owner could not reason-
ably foresee the harm to third parties which might result upon a
failure to remove the ignition key from a vehicle. They do not
see the risk of harm to innocent persons as substantial enough to
warrant the imposition of a duty on an owner. Other courts have
either passed over the issue of a duty, or alternatively rested
their denial of liability on the lack of a legally sufficient causal
relation between negligence in failing to remove the keys and
2. Hereinafter cited as the instant case.
3. W. PROSSER, LAw OF TORTS 146 (3d ed. 1964).
4. Id.
5. But see Schaff v. R.V. Claxton, Inc., 144 F.2d 532 (D.C. Cir. 1944).
6. Unless otherwise specified "owner" will refer to the party responsible for
leaving keys in the ignition.
7. E.g., Shafer v. Monte Mansfield Motors, 91 Ariz. 331, 372 P.2d 333 (1962); Rich-
ards v. Stanley, 43 Cal. 2d 60, 271 P.2d 23 (1954); Smith v. Leuthner, 156 Conn. 422,
242 A.2d 728 (1968); Consiglio v. Ahem, 5 Conn. Cir. 304, 251 A.2d 92 (App. Div. 1968);
George v. Breising, 206 Kan. 221, 477 P.2d 983 (1970).
8. Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R., 248 N.Y. 339, '344, 162 N.E. 99, 100 (1928).
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the eventual injury to an innocent third party." It has been
held that the owner could not reasonably foresee the independent
criminal activity of the thief and his negligent driving," or that
the thief's activity was an intervening and superseding cause which
operated to insulate the defendant from liability. The latter
ground would appear to assume the first, for if the thief's move-
ments were reasonably foreseeable, then it would generally fol-
low that his criminal act was not a superseding cause.12 In this
area it is apparent that foreseeability plays a significant role
in both questions of duty and proximate cause. At times, courts
have attempted to distinguish the application of foreseeability
to duty from its application to proximate cause.13 Consequently,
foreseeability may be employed differently in an analysis of duty
than in an analysis of proximate cause. If so, it is possible to view
an event as foreseeable in terms of proximate cause, yet still per-
ceive the same event as unforeseeable in terms of duty.1 4 Yet,
foreseeability may not be the only factor relevant to questions
of duty and proximate cause.15 If this is the case, courts may well
be using foreseeability as a convenient formula to be applied in
various situations while not intending that its function in an ex-
amination of duty be identical with its functon in an examination
of proximate cause. Although the elements of duty may not
correspond precisely with those involved in proximate cause,
both determinations may be used to make policy decisions with
respect to liability.' 6 Consequently, foreseeability may on occa-
sion simply-be the rationalized grounds on which a court decides
9. E.g., Kalberg v. Anderson Bros. Motor Co., 251 Minn. 461, 88 N.W.2d 197
(1958); Lotito v. Kyriacus, 272 App. Div. 635, 74 N.Y.S.2d 599 (4th Dep't 1947),
appeal dismissed, 297 N.Y. 1027, 80 N.E.2d 542 (1948); Stone v. Bethea, 251 S.C. 157,
161 S.E.2d 171 (1968). See also George v. Breising, 206 Kan. 221, 477 P.2d 983 (1970);
and cases cited note 25, infra.
10. See, e.g., Permenter v. Milner Chevrolet Co., 229 Miss. 385, 91 So. 2d 243
(1956); Saracco v. Lyttle, 11 N.J. Super. 254, 78 A.2d 288 (App. Div. 1951); Stone
v. Bethea, 251 S.C. 157, 161 S.E.2d 171 (1968).
11. See Kalberg v. Anderson Bros. Motor Co., 251 Minn. 461, 88 N.W.2d 197 (1958).
12. See Meihost v. Meihost, 29 Wis. 2d 537, 547, 139 N.W.2d 116, 121 (1966) (con-
curring opinion). See also REsTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 447 (1965).
13. Richards v. Stanley, 43 Cal. 2d 60, 68-69, 271 P.2d 23, 28-29 (1954).
14. Id.
15. See generally Green, The Duty Problem In Negligence Cases, 28 COLUM. L. REv'.
1014 (1928); Green, The Duty Problem In Negligence Cases: II, 29 CoLuMI. L. REv. 255
(1929).
16. See W. PRossER, LAW oF TORTS 288, 305-09, 331-34 (3d ed. 1964). See generally
Green, supra note 15.
RECENT CASES
to limit the liability of a party for his acts. However, courts do
not always free the owner from liability where there is no statute
proscribing the leaving of keys in the ignition. All the facts of
a given case are necessary for a determination of foreseeability
and thus liability. Consequently, where factors such as the char-
acter of the neighborhood 17 or the great attraction of a vehicle'
exist to put a reasonable man on notice that theft or tampering
is likely to occur, the owner may well be held liable' 9
The existence of a statute similar to New York's section 1210
(a) has occasionally had the effect of changing the common
law. However, the presence of a statute should not alter the
basic questions of duty and proximate cause; it should simply
change the examination of the question, at least with respect
to duty. Although violation of a statute may often constitute
negligence20 this should not conclusively determine the issue
of liability, for it must also be determined that the violation was
an act of negligence with respect to a particular plaintiff.
The plaintiff may be outside the class designed to be protected
by the statute.2' The statute may be designed to protect interests
other than those which were invaded.22 It may have been in-
tended to protect against harms or hazards different from those
occurring in a given case.23 These considerations relate to the
question of duty. That is: does the statute require the defendant
to act in a certain manner because it is designed to protect this
plaintiff with such an interest from these possible harms? Where
a statute similar to section 1210 (a) exists, courts occasionally
resolve the duty question in favor of the owner and thus attach
no liability to his acts. In so holding, it is usually determined
that the statute was not enacted to protect the interests of in-
17. See Hergenrether v. East, 61 Cal. 2d 440, 393 P.2d 164, 39 Cal. Rptr. 4 (1964).
18. See Richardson v. Ham, 44 Cal. 2d 772, 285 P.2d 269 (1955); Bronk v. Davenny,
25 Wash. 2d 443, 171 P.2d 237 (1946).
19. Thus, special circumstances are sometimes sufficient to allow a finding of fore-
seeability of harm to third parties and consequently liability of an owner. See Mezyk
v. National Repossessions, Inc., 241 Ore. 333, 405 P.2d 840 (1965), allowing
the plaintiff to show special circumstances before the trier of fact. For an appli-
cation of this rule in Oregon, see Roberts v. Pendleton Airmotive, Inc ......... Ore ..........
484 P.2d 308 (1971) (not imposing liability).
20. See W. PRossER, LAW OF ToRTs 191 (3d ed. 1964); RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF ToRTs § 286 (1965).




jured third parties or public safety. Instead, the courts construe
the legislation as a measure to aid police by reducing thefts or as
a means of furthering the owner's property interests. -4 In these
instances, the courts do not perceive the statute as defining
a reasonable standard of conduct with respect to the public. Yet
in denying liability where ignition key legislation exists, most
courts have not given primary consideration to the question of duty
or standard of care defined by the statute. Rather they have de-
clared that the proximate cause of the injury was the intervening
act of the thief.25 Once again the question becomes one of fore-
seeability as applied to proximate cause, with a judicial deter-
mination that the events were unforeseeable, thus requiring a
finding of no proximate cause as a matter of law. In ignoring
the question of duty while finding no proximate cause it would
seem that a court is implicitly assuming that the statute
did not contemplate injury to third parties by a thief.
It is hard to imagine a court deciding that injury occurring in a
manner foretold by the statute, in other words foreseeable in
terms of duty, is however, unforeseeable in terms of proxi-
mate cause.26 Thus, those jurisdictions denying liability could
possibly have based their decisions on duty under the statute as
well as on proximate cause. This is not to say that proximate cause
is an inappropriate means of determining liability, but rather to
point out that questions of duty and proximate cause are not nec-
essarily independent and that either may be a satisfactory ground
on which to rest policy decisions.
Not all courts deny liability where appropriate legislation has
been enacted. A number of jurisdictions with statutes similar to
New York's have found them to be public safety measures. In
those jurisdictions it has usually been held that the effect of the
24. See Sullivan v. Griffin, 318 Mass. 359, 61 N.E.2d 330 (1945); Mcihost V. Mci-
host, 29 Wis. 2d 537, 139 N.W.2d 116 (1966).
25. E.g., Kiste v. Red Cab, Inc., 122 Ind. App. 587, 106 N.E.2d 395 (1952); Call
v. Huffman, 163 So. 2d 397 (La. Cir. Ct. App.), writ refused, 246 La. 376, 164 So. 2d 361
(1964); Galbraith v. Levin, 323 Mass. 255, 81 N.E.2d 560 (1948); Anderson v. Theisen,
231 Minn. 369, 43 N.W.2d 272 (1950); Ross v. Nutt, 177 Ohio St. 113, 203 N.E.2d 118
(1968).
26. See Ross v. Hartman, 139 F.2d 14, 15 (D.C. Cir. 1943), cert. denied, 321 U.S.
790 (1944).
27. Ney v. Yellow Cab Co., 2 Ill. 2d 74, 117 N.E.2d 74 (1954); Davis v. Thornton,
384 Mich. 138, 180 N.W.2d 11 (1970); Justus v. Wood, 209 Tenn. 55, 348 S.W.2d 332
(1961).
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statute is to reverse the common law rule that no liability exists as
a matter of law. However, this does not necessarily mean that lia-
bility is conclusively established. These jurisdictions hold that
the statute has the effect of allowing the jury to determine lia-
bility via proximate cause, foreseeability, or negligence itself."
However, at least one court has determined that liability may exist
as a matter of law.29
In New York the course of decisions has been typical of
other jurisdictions. In the absence of a statute the owner has not
been held liable to third parties unless circumstances were such
as to put the owner on notice that his vehicle might be interfered
with.30 After the enactment of section 1210 (a) the courts turned
to an examination of the statute and its history to determine
whether it should be deemed to modify the common law rule.
This is the line of reasoning adopted in the instant case. Here
the court was faced with problems of fact as well as law.31 The court
resolved the factual issue in favor of the plaintiff by holding
that there was sufficient conflict in the evidence to warrant a jury
determination and thus sustained the jury's finding that the
keys were left in the ignition and not in the glove compartment. 2
The court then proceeded to examine the statute and its his-
tory and found in accordance with the previous case law that
28. See cases cited, supra note 27.
29. See Ross v. Hartman, 139 F.2d 14 (D.C. Cir. 1943), cert. denied, 321 U.S. 790
(1944), followed in Gaither v. Myers, 404 F.2d 216 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
30. For cases holding no liability, see Maloney v. Kaplan, 233 N.Y. 426, 135 N.E.
838 (1922); Dwarte v. First Westchester Natl Bank, 5 App. Div. 2d 1011, 174 N.Y.$.2d
308 (2d Dep't 1958); Lotito v. Kyriacus, 272 App. Div. 635, 74 N.Y.S.2d 599 (4th Dep't
1947), appeal dismissed, 297 N.Y. 1027, 80 N.E.2d 542 (1948); Walter v. Bond, 267 App.
Div. 779, 45 N.Y.S.2d 378 (2d Dep't 1943), af'd, 292 N.Y. 574, 54 N.E.2d 691 (1944);
Mann v. Parshall, 229 App. Div. 366, 241 N.Y.S. 673 (4th Dep't 1930); Kaplan v. Shults
Bread Co., 212 App. Div. 110, 208 N.Y.S. 118 (1st Dep't 1925). For cases where there is
possible liability under given circumstances, see Tierney v. New York Dugan Bros. Inc.,
288 N.Y. 16, 41 N.E.2d 161 (1942) ; Connell v. Berland, 223 App. Div. 234, 228 N.Y.S. 20
(1st Dep't), af'd, 248 N.Y. 641, 162 N.E. 557 (1928); Gumbrell v. Clausen Flanagan
Brewery, 199 App. Div. 778, 192 N.Y.S. 451 (2d Dep't 1922); Lee v. Van Beuren & New
York Bill Posting Co., 190 App. Div. 742, 180 N.YS. 295 (1st Dep't 1920).
31. There was a substantial question as to whether the defendant did in fact violate
the statute by leaving his keys in the ignition. The weight of the evidence tended to
show that the theft was accomplished with the use of a spare set of keys which were
accidentally left in the glove compartment. However the jury reached another con-
clusion.
32. Instant case at 227, 319 N.Y.S.2d at 711.
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one purpose of the legislation was to protect the public safety."
The court quoted the legislative history which stated that the
act was "'designed to obviate the risk of a vehicle moving from
the place where it was left parked and possibly injuring the per-
son or property of others as well as itself being damaged. It serves
to lessen the likelihood of theft.' 34 Consequently, the statute was
deemed to modify the common law rule, thus presenting jury
questions as to defendant's negligence and the proximate cause
of the injury. One judge dissented on the law holding that the
theft and the negligence of the thief were not reasonably fore-
seeable and thus no liability should attach to the defendant."
Since the decision in the instant case rests on the New York
statute and its purpose as discerned from the legislative history,
it is relevant to briefly examine that history in somewhat greater
detail than did the court.:6 It has been noted that the Joint
Legislative Committee on Motor Vehicle Problems intended
this section as a measure designed to prevent vehicles from leav-
ing their parked position and harming other parties as well
as from being stolen.37 In addition, the committee commented
on the then "present law" noting that owners were not liable
to third parties when unknown persons moved a vehicle 8 How-
ever, the committee stopped short of claiming that the pro-
posed law would create such liability. Instead they merely pointed
out that their proposal, although probably ineffective against a
professional thief, would tend "to deter youngsters intending to
'joyride.' " Thus, the committee saw that the statute would be
33. Id. at 228, 319 N.Y.S.2d at 711. As to prior cases reaching similar conclusions,
see In re Smith, 57 Misc. 2d 576, 293 N.Y.S.2d 373 (Sup. Ct. 1968), modified, 34 App.
Div. 2d 629, 309 N.Y.S.2d 536 (1st Dep't 1970); Padro v. Knobloch, 28 Misc. 2d 898, 214
N.Y.S.2d 216 (Sup. Ct. 1961); Kass v. Schneiderman, 21 Misc, 2d 518, 197 N.Y.S.2d 979
(New York Mun. Ct. 1960). See also Waldorf v. Sorbo, 10 App. Div. 2d 226, 198 N.Y.S.2d
555 (3d Dep't 1960) (Bergan & Gibson, JJ., dissenting); Watts v. Colonial
Sand & Stone, Inc., 64 Misc. 2d 889, 316 N.Y.S.2d 482 (Sup. Ct. 1970).
34. Instant case at 228, 319 N.Y.S.2d at 711, citing 7 N.Y. LEG. Doc. 1954 No. 36 at
106-07.
35. Id. at 230, 319 N.Y.S.2d at 713. There were two dissenting opinions; both
felt that the case should be reversed on the facts and only one judge stated a disagree-
ment on the law.
36. The history is contained in 7 N.Y. Lc. Doc. 1954 No. 36 at 106.07. This is a
Joint Legislative Committee report advocating the enactment of a section to the
Vehicle and Traffic Law identical in its relevant part to the present section 1210(a).
37. See 7 N.Y. LEG. Doc. 1954 No. 36 at 106.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 107.
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most effective against those "thieves" whose purpose was not
basically economic, but rather excitement. Furthermore, they
went on to speak of the attraction which automobiles hold to
children: "An unlocked car with keys left in the ignition is, [sic]
likely to seem an irresistible plaything to many children."40
Given these passages it appears that the committee was anticipat-
ing the danger to innocent parties when inexperienced or "joy-
riding" persons gain control of a powerful mechanical device,
and felt it substantial enough to deserve mention. Thus, depite
the lack of precise language to the effect that the proposal was in-
tended to overrule the common law, there does exist significant
support for the contention that the statute was promulgated as a
safety measure.
Although it appears that the New York statute alters the com-
mon law solution to the question of liability in the instant
situation, it unfortunately may not be the final answer. In a de-
cision subsequent to the instant case it was held as a matter
of law that an owner would not be liable for the negligence of a
thief in causing injury to third parties where the stolen vehicle
was left unattended on private property.41 The controlling dis-
tinction was the inapplicability of the statute upon private land
not open to the public. 42 Consequently, the court relied on the
old common law formula and found no liability because the owner
was fortunate enough to park his car in his own driveway, some
30 feet from the public road.43 This result may indeed be con-
sistent with a strict reading of the instant case. However, it ap-
pears that such a holding would create an anomolous situation
within New York.44 Liability would depend upon factors quite
unrelated to any functional justification for either rule. The
distinction between parking in the street or in one's nearby drive-
way would be controlling. However, liability should not be pre-
dicated on such irrelevant circumstances. The distinction be-
40. Id.
41. See General Accident Group v. Noonan, 66 Misc. 2d 528, 321 N.Y.S.2d 483
(Sup. Ct. 1971).
42. N.Y. VEHICLE AND TRAFFic LIW § 1100 (a) (McKinney 1970).
43. 66 Misc. 2d at 530, 321 N.Y.S.2d at 485 (Sup. Ct. 1971).
44. Some jurisdictions which have based liability, in the instant situation, on
statutes have also retained the common law formula where the statute is inapplicable.
See Lorang v. Heinz, 108 Ill. App. 2d 451, 248 N.E.2d 785 (1969); Young v. Castner-
Eagleton Motors, Inc., 214 Tenn. 306, 379 S.W.2d 785 (1964); Martel v. Chattanooga
Parking Stations, Inc .......... Tenn .......... 453 S.W.2d 767 (1970).
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tween these two situations does not appear to be of major
significance. To sanction the existence of different rules in the
cases of private and public areas it would appear desirable to have
a functional difference between the two situations. Such a basis
would exist if it were shown that the likelihood of theft is
materially lessened when automobiles are parked on private land.
However, such an assertion seems tenuous at best. Typically
the private driveway is not so isolated that it presents a signi-
ficant deterrent to the theft of a vehicle. Consequently, if there is
essentially no difference other than title to the land, the appro-
priate solution would be to create a uniform rule of law.45 The
question then arises as to which rule should prevail. An answer
to this requires a broader examination of the various issues in-
volved.
With or without a statute, it is necessary to examine both the
issues of duty and proximate cause in attempting to assess whether
an owner should ever be liable to a third party injured by a stolen
vehicle where theft results from leaving the keys in the igni-
tion. In terms of proximate cause the issue is whether in today's
world it can reasonably be foreseen that failure to remove the
ignition key may lead to theft and that the thief will be negligent
in his operation of the stolen vehicle. Different jurisdictions have
at times determined this question "as a matter of law" and reached
differing results upon similar facts.46 Each court determined that
no reasonable man could differ in his view, yet opposite results
were reached. It may be that one conclusion is justified in a rural
environment given the possibility of a low theft rate, while the
reverse is correct in an urbanized area. Thus, there may be
some jurisdictions where "matter of law"determinations are ap-
propriate because of certain social and environmental factors.
In addition, some factual settings may be so extreme that a "mat-
ter of law" holding would be warranted in any jurisdiction.
45. Of course it is conceivable that the courts may desire to free the owner of
liability in both circumstances, yet fcc constrained by the statute to impose liability
where the violation occurred on public roads. However, this does not appear to be the
case; the opinions do not indicate hostility toward the statute, but rather tend to be
slightly liberal in their interpretation of the statute and its history
46. Compare Ross v. Hartman, 139 F.2d 14 (D.C. Cir. 1943), cert. denied, 321
U.S. 790 (1944), with Hersh v. Miller, 169 Neb. 517, 99 N.W.2d 878 (1959).
47. For example, a professional thief may steal a vehicle, keys being left in the
ignition, and transfer it to someone who believes he has valid title. An ensuing accident
caused by this new "owner" would probably not be sufficient to impose lia-
bility on the originally negligent owner.
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Nonetheless, it would seem that in general the question of proxi-
mate cause, in the instant situation, should be one for the jury,
since reasonable men may readily differ in their views. 48
The issue of the existence of a duty raises somewhat different
considerations. If relevant legislation exists, yet is found to create
no duty, or is found not to govern the precise situation be-
fore the court, then no liability can attach for violation of the
statute. This, however, should not end the inquiry.49 Even
though the statute may not impose a duty running toward third
persons, it is still relevant to examine the question of a common
law duty. Times change ahd so must the standards which govern
reasonable men. That which may not have been reasonably
foreseeable in the first half of this century may today be a
readily perceivable consequence of an act or omission. Indeed,
several courts have been influenced by some recent statistics
concerning the accident rate for stolen vehicles.5  These
statistics indicate that stolen cars are 200 times more likely to be
involved in an accident than the average vehicle.5' In the past,
some courts in denying liability in the instant situation
have felt that it would be anomolous to hold an owner liable at
,common law for a thief's negligence when the same owner would
not be liable at common law for the negligence of one given per-
mission to use the vehicle.5 - However, if the above statistics
are correct, it would appear that the risk of injury to third parties
is significantly enhanced when a car is stolen as opposed to merely
being loaned. Consequently, it may be logical to impose a duty
48. This, of course, assumes that the court does not wish to use proximate cause as
the basis for reaching a decision on policy grounds. It is conceivable that a court could
view the instant situation as establishing proximate cause but not a common law duty.
See supra note 13 and accompanying text. However, the court may also be faced with a.
statute which strongly suggests that it creates a duty. Thus, if for some reason, the court
is convinced that it should not impose liability despite these prerequisites, it may wish
to use proximate cause as the grounds on which to rest its decision.
49. See Meihost v. Meihost, 29 Wis. 2d 537, 540, 139 N.W.2d 116, 118 (1966).
50. See Gaither v. Myers, 404 F.2d 216 (D.C. Cir. 1968); Davis v. Thornton,
384 Mich. 138, 180 N.W.2d 11 (1970).
51. See Hearings on H.R. 15215 Before Subcomm. No. 5 of the House Comm. on
the Judiciary, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., 34 (1968); Gaither v. Myers, 404 F.2d 216, 222-23
(D.C. Cir. 1968). See also Peck, An Exercise Based Upon Empirical Data: Liability
For Harm Caused by Stolen Automobiles, 1969 Wis. L. REv. 909, 915, which gives some
critical insights into these statistics as well as providing a reprint of the statistical
summary.
52. See Bennett v. Arctic Insulation, Inc., 258 F.2d 652, 654 (9th Cir. 1958);
Richards v. Stanley, 48 Cal. 2d 60, 65-66, 271 P.2d 23, 28 (1954).
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on owners to take precautions toward preventing their vehicles
from being easily stolen.
Although it appears that the danger to the public is greater
when a thief has possession of a vehicle than when a lawful driver is
in control, courts in the absence of an applicable statute are still
prone to discuss duty in terms of foreseeability. 3 While this
may indeed be quite convenient at times, such terms may also
mask the policy determinations which, can be relevant to questions
of duty. A thief is negligent in his operation of a stolen vehicle
and injures a third party. The faultless victim begins to look for
a defendant capable of adequately compensating him and this is
generally not the thief. However, the owner has made a seemingly
innocuous error; a minor mistake whose possible consequences are
not glaringly apparent. Thus the issue: who should bear the loss?
A proper answer to this question is not always easy. A statute may
help, but unless the statute is explicit and applicable, other
values must necessarily enter the picture. Factors such as the
extent of damage which may result, the possibility that it will
occur, the social utility in the owner's acts, the hardship placed
on an owner by requiring compliance, and the existence of "moral"
blame are all relevant to the issue. In addition, other considera-
tions including foreseeability may also be important to a deter-
mination of whether a duty existsY4 In the final analysis it is
for the court to balance the countervailing policies and attempt
to do justice. While this may not be easy given the changing nature
of our society, a solution should be reached. In New York, the
lower courts have used ignition key legislation to expose an owner
to possible liability, but have not extended such beyond those
situations where the statute is directly applicable." However,
to limit liability on this basis tends to ignore some important
considerations. The fact that the Joint Legislative Committee
-was able to foresee and comment on the danger to innocent
parties when keys are left in the ignition of a vehicle should still
53. See, e.g., Shafer v. Monte Mansfield Motors, 91 Ariz. 331, 372 P.2d 333
(1962); Richards v. Stanley, 43 Cal. 2d 60, 271 P.2d 23 (1954); George v. Breising,
206 Kan. 221, 477 P.2d 983 (1970); McKinney v. Chambers, 347 S.W.2d 30 (rex. Ct. Civ.
App. 1961).
54. See Green, Foresecability in Negligence Law, 61 CoLuM. L. Rv. 1401, 1420-24
(1961); Green, The Duty Problem in Negligence Cases, 28 COLUM. L. Rav. 1014 (1928);
.Green, The Duty Problem In Negligence Cases: 1, 29 COLum. L. R V. 255 (1929).
55. See General Accident Group v. Noonan, 66 Misc. 2d 528, 321 N.Y.S2d 483
<Sup. Ct. 1971).
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be relevant despite the inapplicability of the statute in a given
situation. The committee's discussion begins to point out the de-
gree of risk created under such circumstances. In addition the
statistics concerning the accident rate for stolen vehicles should
not be brushed aside lightly. When these factors, along with the
great potential for injury inherent in automobile operation, are
weighed against the utility of freely permitting an owner to leave
his keys in the ignition, it would appear that any decision to
categorically deny liability must necessarily be based on other
considerations. It is here that foreseeability plays its primary
role, for a court may still feel justified in reaching a conclusion
that no liability should attach if it truly believes that a reasonable
man would not generally be able to foresee the possibility of in-
jury to third parties. Why should a man be held liable for the
negligent driving of another unless he is capable of discerning the
risk and proceeding in a manner designed to insulate himself from
that contingency? The answer is not that this is a situation for
strict liability. But rather, as was attested to by the committee
report, there does exist some degree of foreseeability in this
class of cases. This, when coupled with the ease with which an
owner may prevent the possibility of harm as well as the relatively
high incidence of accidents of this variety, supplies the basis for the
contention that the owner and not the innocent third party should
be the one to bear the loss.5 6
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56. Whatever the rule in New York should eventually be, not all innocent third
parties will be forced to bear the entire loss. Assuming a penniless thief and no lia-
bility on the part of the owner, a motorist with insurance prescribed by the State
of New York may be able to collect on the uninsured motorist provision in his policy.
However, he will be limited to an amount of $10,000 for an individual injury and
$20,000 for one accident. See N.Y. INS. LAW § 167 (2a) (McKinney 1970).

